So Aristotle provided the means for an argument for fatalism (the view that the future is set, and nothing can be otherwise than it is). The argument can be stated like this:
1. For any statement S, the claim “Either S or not S” is true now. (That’s just logic.)
2. So, let S be a statement about the future (like, “I will have cereal tomorrow for breakfast”).
3. So, either S is true now, or not-S is true now (from #1).
4. If S is true now, then the future is set now (with regard to S) and there’s no avoiding it.
5. If not-S is true now, then the future is set now (with regard to S) and there’s no avoiding it.
6. So, either way, the future is set now (with regard to S) and there’s no avoiding it.
And this argument can be made about every statement about the future!
That’s the rough idea anyway. What do you think about it? Does it show fatalism is true? If not, where does the argument go wrong?
(I should note that Aristotle hated the conclusion so much that he used this argument to show that #3 doesn’t really follow from #1. So “Either I will have cereal tomorrow or I won’t” is true now, even though “I will have cereal tomorrow” is not true now, and “I won’t have cereal tomorrow” is not true now. In other words: even though S is not true now, and not-S is not true now, “either S or not-S” is true now. This, I think, is a very awkward thing to believe!)
I don’t think Aristotle’s solution is as awkward as you seem to think it is. It is worth quoting The Philosopher (Aristotle) from De Interpretation:
“What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. … But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not.”
What he is doing here is curtailing the move from truth to necessity. This is perfectly legitimate. Not all truths are necessary truths. Either-Ors, say “Either X or not-X”, are necessary truths (at least those that do not present a false dilemma of some kind, like “You are either with us or against us”). But the individual declarative assertions (‘X’ or ‘Not-X’) need not be. So “Either S or not-S” is true now, but neither ‘S’ nor ‘not-S’ is true now, because they are contingent rather than necessary truths.
So it is necessarily true that I will “Either I will eat cereal tomorrow morning or not”, but “I will eat cereal” or “I will not eat cereal” are not true now because they are not necessary truths. Their truth depends on a future condition that is characterized by spontaneity rather than necessity (my free choice).
Does introducing the necessary vs contingent distinction help?
I still think it is odd to say “P or Q is true now” while denying both “P is true now” and “Q is true now.” But here’s a response, hinted at by Kleiner, that I do like: “P or not-P” in necessarily true now, but neither P nor not-P is NECESSARILY true now. Maybe P is true; maybe not-P is true. But neither of them is necessarily true. The disjunction “P or not-P” is necessarily true, though, just because there’s no possible third alternative.
This would still mean there are truths about the future — e.g., it is true now that I will have cereal tomorrow — but those truths aren’t necessary. The argument is sound, but doesn’t show the future is necessary. It only shows that the future is set and WON’T be avoided, not that it CAN’T be avoided!
Disclaimer: this is a provisional disagreement. We have ventured into muddy waters.
I agree that neither ‘S’ n or ‘not-S’ are necessarily true. But Huenemaan suggests that either ‘S’ or ‘not-S’ is contingently true now and so, in some sense, the “future is set”. I disagree.
What sense is there in saying that something is “true now” if the condition that would make it true (say, my choosing to eat cereal tomorrow morning) is as yet undecided? Since at least some future events can be caused by a free (undetermined) will, it is not the case that they are “true now” – as if they were already set but we just did not know it yet. This is not just an epistemic issue – where we seem free only because we have not seen future inevitable truths. On the contrary, while “Either S or not-S” is necessarily true now, NEITHER ‘S’ nor ‘not-S’ are true now. The truth or falsity of those claims is contingent on my free will, which has not yet made its judgment.
I’m saying the truth of S, or the truth of not-S, is now determined. Not made necessary; things could go otherwise. But they won’t. So, either it’s true now that you’ll eat cereal, or it’s true now that you won’t, and either way, there is now a truth about what WILL happen. But not about what MUST happen.
I think Aristotle wouldn’t go for this, since I think he believes in contra-causal free will, or libertarian free will. He believes that some questions about the future aren’t yet determined because the choices have yet to be made, and those choices are not yet determined. (And I think you agree with him.) That’s why he wants to say that “P or not-P” is true even though the truth values of P and not-P are not yet determined. But I say that believing this just an ad hoc move to save contra-causal free will.
I am not clear on how you are distinguishing between what “will” happen and what “must” happen. On the one hand you say that the truth of S is already determined (which sounds like a must). But then you back off that and say it merely “will” happen, not that it must happen.
Sure, either ‘S’ or ‘not-S’ will happen. That is just the either or. We agree there – these either-ors (assuming they are not false dilemmas) are necessarily true. But it is not that case that ‘S’ must happen or that ‘not’-S’ must happen. EITHER S will happen or not-S will happen. And which actually happens is as yet undetermined because the condition that would make ‘S’ or ‘not-S’ true or false is not yet actual. ‘S’ and ‘not-S’ are contingent truths. By “contingent” I mean both ‘not logically necessary’ but also “contingent” in the sense of being dependent on something else.
I ask you – what is it that would make ‘S’ or ‘not-S’ true? If it is not yet determined, then how can ‘S’ or ‘not-S’ already be actually true? While “Either S or not-S” is actually true now, aren’t ‘S’ and ‘not-S’ only potentially true now, since they are contingent on some future (not-actual but possible) event or choice?
Aside: As much as I enjoy doing some philosophy with Huenemann – any students out there with some thoughts?
Perhaps the problem with the first argument is a move made from Premise 1 to premise 3.
To restate:
Premise 1: For any statement S, the claim “Either S or not S” is true now. (That’s just logic.)
Premise 3: So, either S is true now, or not-S is true now (from #1).
An important change has been made from 1 to 3. It seems to me that these are two very different propositions. Let’s use quotation marks to help us along here.
Proposition 1: “Either S or not S” is true now
Proposition 2: “Either S is true now or not S is true now”
or, perhaps: Either “S” is true now or “not S” is true now
We all agree that Proposition 1 is necessarily true, or is “true now”. But what is true now is “Either S or not S”. That is not the same thing as saying that “S’ or “not S”, taken individually, is true now.
Right? Or does this lowly continental philosopher need to brush up on his logic skills?
No, your logic skils are just fine, or at least as good as Aristotle’s! I think you’re making the same move he does — namely, to make a disjunction true now without making either of the disjuncts true now. I don’t know if I can prove that that simply cannot be right, but it is a little weird, and it seems to me motivated only by the desire to avoid the fatalist’s conclusion. But I’m proposing a different way to avoid the fatalist conclusion: let one of the disjuncts be true now (of course, we don’t know which one), but then deny that it is necessarily true. The only “cost” of my proposal is that you’ll have to be a compatibilist, meaning that you’ll have to give up on the idea that “free” means undetermined. I think an action can be free while still be determined; what matters is that the action be caused in the right way, by desires and beliefs. The action could have been otherwise only in the sense that HAD the agents desires and beliefs been otherwise, s/he would have acted differently. But, things being as they are, the future is set.
Hello, I am just a physicist who just recently started reading your discussions, so this is a belated post. I assume I will listen but won’t post often. It may be best if Philosophy touch base with the modern empiricist philosophers (physicists) once in a while.
Current understanding of physical “reality” does not view the future proposition as you are stating it. To restate the first proposition I must first place ‘me’ as a willful observer of S. Maybe S is that a precariously standing object or an object fallen from its precarious position.
For the sake of simplicity the object can be precariously fallen too so it might spontaneously stand from a fallen position. In physics the situation is usually simplified to a binary situation where no other possibilities exist, so this particular object cannot have any other condition other than standing or fallen.
Proposition 1. I now observe the object standing or I observe the object fallen.
One of these situations is observed to be true. Your second proposition currently reads thusly,
Proposition 2. Tomorrow the object will be standing or fallen.
One of these situations will be true. This is classical physics from a deterministic science era. It is no longer valid to state proposition 2 above. The new statement for the future is determined only by the probability of the likelihood of the outcomes, that is:
Proposition 2. Currently, we can state that the tomorrow both situations ARE true. The object is in a mixed state of reality where it is 50% standing and 50% fallen.
The future possibilities are both true in a mixed state. The curious thing is that the reality remains a probabilistic truth even as tomorrow comes and goes if the willful observer decides to NOT observe the condition until one month from today. So when 7 days have passed, the past truth was that the object was both fallen (50%) and standing (50%). Finally, when a month goes by and I decide to look at the object on the table then I will find it to be one or the other. Perhaps I find that it is standing, The past month of reality becomes determined by that willful observation!!!!!! From careful observation I determine that it is standing and has never fallen. Now the entire history has only one possible state. Until it was observed the reality was that the object was both fallen and standing, that is, a mix reality! The reality of standing AND fallen mixed state ” collapses” to a single history rather than a mixture of possibility histories for the whole month once the observer willfully looked.
As far as any science experiments have demonstrated in the last one hundred years, THIS IS REALITY. There is no hidden information that would make the unobserved object anything but a mixed state of being both fallen and standing. This is a variation on the Schrodinger’s Cat thought puzzle.
On second thought, perhaps your propositions address the question: “Is the observer free or predestined to look at the object?” Perhaps your propositions do eventually work with the observer. However if the observer in placed within the quantum experiment, that is, did the observer observe tomorrow or not observe tomorrow, then the observer becomes a mixture of states that are both true until an external observer willfully observes the internal observer who is observing the object. This becomes a series of more external observers as we move each external observer into the quantum experiment. This probably leads us to Anselm’s “proof” of the existence of God. … the Most Holy (separated) Observer!
Dr. Kliener, if you get a paper out of this, I want co-authorship!
Vince54@yahoo.com
Perhaps it is closer to the ‘First Mover’ proof of God. However, it is curious that there must be a primary willful Observer to ‘collapse’ the universes reality into a particular history given the current understanding of physics. This Observer must be willful and external to it all, that is, the Observer is separate from the universe, which is identical to the Jewish meaning of Holy (separate). There maybe arguments that allow the Universe to be self-observing (I don’t see how), this may allow a Spinoza Universe as Huenemann would probably prefer.
The conudrum also is posed: Are the 6 billion internal observers on planet earth predestined observers or willful observers. From their point of view they are external observers to their reality and it appears to each one that they are determining history through willful observation. From the fully separated (Holy) Observer’s view, all are determined by His+Her willfull observing.
Interesting. Interesting.
I think the self-observing Universe would be necessarily deterministic to itself. Spinoza would be fine with that, but would physics? Is there a necessary external Observer for history to be anything but a mixture of states? Obviously, this all depends on Quantum Mechanics being true, but at least it is empirically testable as to its usefulness in providing accurate predictions of repeatably observed ‘reality’ (carefully worded statement of science).
Welcome, Vince! It is interesting to think whether/how quantum mechanics changes or invalidates the fatalism argument. One way the fatalist might try to repair the argument is by changing the statements to the form:
At time T (future), X (if observed) will be in state S or will be not-in-state-S.
I take it we can now say that this sort of statement is true, though we don’t know which state X will be in, and there is not now any sort of deterministic chain of causes that will make either outcome inevitable. If the disjunctive statement is true, then the argument gets going, without presupposing any Newtonian physics; just logic. If the disjuntion is true now, then doesn’t one of the disjuncts have to be true now — despite the laws of quantum mechanics?
I know that at least one recent philosopher, Hilary Putnam, has argued “no,” and he’s claimed that QM forces us to reject the hallowed law of logic, the Principle of the Excluded Middle (“Either P is true, or not-P is true”). But I think he argued that only in the case of unobserved states, like the Schrodinger cat sort of case.
Regarding your other comments, I think John Wheeler has speculated in the direction of a self-observing universe — the universe as an observing entity that keeps itself collapsed into determined states. I guess one could understand this as a kind of Spinozistic pantheism, and think of thye universe as God. But I don’t know whether there needs to be a further entity to observe the self-observing universe, to make sure it is also collapsed!
I agree with Putnam on the rejection of the Principle of the Excluded Middle for the unobserved condition which imposes mixed states as ‘reality’.
I think John Wheeler’s speculation has the problem of Quantum Mechanics always implying an external observer to the quantum mechanically posed problem. It is truly an existential situation, where Schrodinger’s cat placed within the quantum mechanical wave form is waiting for an external observer. This poses the paradox that I cannot observe myself into a collapsed state, so I need you to observe me into a particular so I can observer you into a particular reality. The self-observing universe might necessarily be deterministic. Spinoza and Einstein would be fine with that but current science says God does role dice.
The anthropogenic universe where a multiplicity of universes exist as uncollapsed possibilities until an observer is born within one of them seems to contradict the Quantum Mechanical posing of the problem with the external observer requirement. Two internal observers might co-observer their realities into existence via ‘I-thou’ relationships that truly take account of each other, but you are still butting up against a first self-observing entity that is internal to the experiment (not quantum mechanical posing of the problem).
I think that, logically, one might be very comfortable with –
If quantum mechanics is empirically true, then external Platonist sphere exists (Christians, Jewishs, Muslims, and Socrates cheer).
If Newtonian deterministic mechanics empirically true, then Spinoza World-Spirit is.
One other caveat exists that I can think of, Quantum Mechanical problems might only be valid on very small simple systems. In the limit of complex-large systems, the quantum mechanical mixed states are collapsed spontaneously … possibly through collisional encounters of two small independent quantum mechanical systems. In this case, one could choose either an external God or Spinoza’s Universe.
I never recognize radical atheism as a possibility. Atheism is a theological belief in a material Universe that is God (semantics). The Universe is God and God doesn’t care.
I favor the view that, given sufficient size, a system collapses — I suppose just because for the life of me I can’t see why an act of measurement, on the part of a conscious observer, should affect a system. It’s groovy in a way, but almost too groovy to be true! But, anyway, I can’t see that the only options are either Platonism or Spinoza. What about William James’s pluralistic universe?
Also, Vince, I don’t think it’s merely a matter of semantics whether the atheist denies God’s existence or believes that the material universe is God. Typically, a theist believes there is a grand person who has concern over what humans do. A pantheist, like Spinoza, thinks there is no such grand person, but thinks there is a thing in the universe that has at least some of the important properties traditionally ascribed to God. But an atheist may deny even this — maybe there is nothing in the universe, and not even the universe itself, which has any of the important properties traditionally ascribed to God. The so-called “universe” — one thing, uniting a multiplicity — may in fact be a “pluraverse,” which is not even united by the laws discovered by scientists. after all, our experience of the universe is severely limited, and what confidence can we have that the laws that seem to apply to what we have observed actually apply as well to the vast range of events we have not observed?
I have had to ponder (and read about) “A Pluralistic Universe”. My quick introduction suggests that James’s pluralistic universe is a recognition of the necessarily subjective truths of the observers within the universe … though does he suggest that the ‘reality’ of the universe is the realities of the universe rather than just subjective perceptions?
The standard Quantum Mechanical approach still represents a monist reality once the observer precipitates a collapsed reality. Other observers of a collapsed of mixed states to a single state will necessarily agree on the final state. There is an alternative Quantum Mechanical approach by David Bohm, which I do not understand (even though I read his book). In regard to the standard interpretation, “A Pluralistic Universe” is excluded. Deterministic classical physics also assumes a monist universe.
I think current and past physics approaches disregard a pluralistic universe. Science tries to discern what is “true” for all observers. I think James might have to be limited to pragmatic truths … which science tries to explain away.
Here is a discussion on the quantum physics implications on free-will determination of the universe: Science Friday at NPR. Paul Davies does what I suggest is not correct for Quantum Mechanics. He puts the conscious observer into the experiment and the conscious observer self-observes to collapse the mixed states into a single state. This is not how Quantum Mechanics poses an experiment, the observer is always outside the physical experiment being observed. Paul Davies desires to demonstrate a self-actualizing universe (i.e., no God). In any case, it is a wonderful discussion of the philosophical implications of the current physical understanding.