Here is a selection from Galen Stawson’s Mental Reality. The fourth paper assignment is to study it, explain it, and respond to it, all in 3-4 pages. It is due in class on Tuesday, April 13th.
Logical positivists and metaphysics: Here is a pdf version of Carnap’s critique of Heidegger:
Carnap-Elimination-of-Metaphysics
Here is a sample paper, from the first assignment:
Two arguments about metaphysical simples:
1. Thesis A: Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts.
Proof: For, suppose that composite substances do not consist of simple parts. In this case, if we were to imagine the composite substance being broken up entirely, so that nothing composite were to remain, then it would follow (on our supposition) that no simple part would remain either. Consequently, we would be left with no substance; consequently, nothing would exist. Either, then, (1) it is impossible to break up the composite substance entirely; or, (2) after such breaking up, there must remain something that exists without being composite, that is, something that is simple. But if (1) is the case, then the composite substance could not really be a composite of substances. Why? Because each of those component substances would be capable of existing entirely on its own, and so there would be nothing to stop the composite substance to be entirely broken up into them. So, since case (1) ends up contradicting the supposition (namely, that we are dealing with a composite substance, the case (2) must contain the truth- that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts.
It follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the world are all, without exception, simple beings—that composition is merely an external condition pertaining to them—and that, although we never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of composition, we must believe them to be the primary subjects of all composition, and consequently as simple substances.
2. Thesis B: No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there does not exist in the world any simple substance.
Proof: Suppose that a composite thing (as substance) does consist of simple parts. Since all external relations, and consequently all groupings of substances, are possible only in space, the space occupied by the composite thing must consist of the same number of parts as is contained in the composite thing. But space does not consist of simple parts, but of infinitely-divisible spaces. So every simple part of the composite thing must also be infinitely divisible. But in that case, the simple is not a simple, but instead a composite. So our assumption – that a composite substance consists in simple parts – must be wrong.
