Aristotelian minds

Ric Machuga gave a fascinating lecture yesterday. His main claim is that in order for there to be meaning in the world, there has to be an immaterial intellect. “Meaning” here isn’t anything fancy; it is just the phenomenon of a set of symbols meaning something, like the way that the word “tool” means tool. You can find a copy of his paper here. Professor Machuga has offered to check this website from time to time, so he’ll respond to any questions or objections you post!

Do arguments change minds?

This topic has come up a couple of times in classes, so I thought I’d post it and see what responses we get. The question is about philosophical arguments, of course, not yelling matches followed by fisticuffs. (If you’re not sure about the difference, see the Monty Python clip over in the VodPod, on the right.) Here are some initial attitudes, for priming the pump:

A “YES” answer: yes, arguments can change minds. Once in a while, someone presents a sets of reasons we accept, and logic requires us to adopt the conclusion. It may not be immediate — the conversation may take weeks, but eventually the force of the reason gets us to change our minds.

A “NO” answer: no, arguments don’t work. Beliefs are based on many factors, including how one was raised, what one’s friends believe, emotional stuff, etc. When someone presents an argument to you, and you change your mind, it’s not the argument that does it. Rather, you were already disposed toward changing your mind, and the argument just gives you the “excuse” for doing so. Arguments merely justify beliefs you already have; they don’t give you those beliefs.

What do you all think?

Writing philosophy

We’re at the point of the term when papers are coming due, so it’s good to remind ourselves what makes for good philosophical writing. Recently I saw a nice aphorism (attributed to Timothy Williamson) that is relevant here: “To be precise is to make it as easy as possible for others to prove one wrong.” It’s really tempting to let one’s writing get slushy in the hope of currying the reader’s favor. But our task as philosophers is to get things exactly right, in as clear a way as possible, IN THE HOPE THAT someone will point out exactly where we have gotten things wrong. We won’t learn anything if others can’t point out our mistakes. And we do ourselves a disfavor when we write in such a way as to make this less likely to happen.

So: SAY IT, SAY IT EXACTLY RIGHT, AND LEARN!