From brother Nietzsche:
“… today if one hears anyone commended for living ‘wisely’ or ‘like a philosopher’, it means hardly more than ‘prudently and apart’. Wisdom: that seems to the rabble to be a kind of flight, an artiface and means for getting oneself out of a dangerous game; but the genuine philosopher — as he seems to us, my friends? — lives ‘unphilosophically’ and ‘unwisely’, above all imprudently, and bears the burden and duty of a hundred attempts and temptations of life — he risks himself constantly, he plays the dangerous game…”
Comments?
USUPhilosophy 
If living “unphilosophically”, “unwisely”, and most especially “imprudently” is the sign of a genuine philosopher, then I must be the Philosopher King!
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Vince, I think you are right that Nz does have an “I am” philosophy, and he does not allow much room for others to lend meaning to his own life (except perhaps as worthy opponents). It is a real shortcoming. Maybe it’s because he was a loner — or maybe the causal relation works the other way. Actually, I think Kleiner can probably help out here, since the philosophers he reads always are talking about “the Other” in various ways. I think mainstream analytic philosophy is still “self-centered,” even though there are some brilliant analytic philosophers who have clarified how important our obligations to others are. (I’m thinking of Rawls and Singer.)
Doug: you are the king!
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Two thoughts:
1) While I don’t reject Nz’s remark “out-of-hand”, I think Vince (and Buber) are right, the history of philosophy has too often been a history of the self. And Nz is as guilty of this as anyone – this is why Heidegger, in a really nasty dig, calls Nz “the last metaphysician.” And Vince is right, JPII, Ratzinger, and others have taken up the “Other” (the ‘Thou’) in earnest. Buber deserves much of the credit for this new movement, but not all of it. Heidegger’s role cannot be overestimated. Though one might argue (I have) that many of Heidegger’s central concepts are taken right from Kierkegaard. Actually, one of Heidegger’s endless tasks was this constant moving back in history to see where the technological/egological turn in philosophy started. He never quite sorted it out, but we might think that there are glimmers of the ‘Thou’ in even the most entrenched metaphysical figures. In fact, one might suggest that it was Plato’s Socrates that first gave philosophical voice to the Other (‘Thou’). That is what the ‘Sophist’ is really about (call it the “Other” or “non-Being”, you’re talking about the same thing). Just because many analytic philosophers misread Plato here doesn’t mean we have to.
If you want to read more: read Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology” or almost any of the essays in the ‘Basic Writings’ edition. Levinas is perhaps the most famous contemporary philosopher of the “other” – his essay “God and Philosophy” is a good place to start. I am particularly enamored with Marion, “God without Being” is his most famous work. Later Derrida also takes up the concept of the Other. Vince will not be wrong to see Buber hiding in the shadows of most of these texts. More so, he will see that JPII and Ratzinger are not possible without these thinkers.
2) All that said, I don’t reject Nz’s remark out-of-hand. In part this is because I have a Heideggerian (rather than a Derridean) view of the project of deconstruction. While Derrida suggests a deconstruction that is complete and devastating, Heidegger wants deconstruction with recovery. In other words, the task of deconstruction is to re-read the tradition. This seems a much more prudent approach (with apologies to Nz). Fred Lawrence (an absolute master who teaches at Boston College) remarked to a class I was in some years ago that “Heidegger has made it possible to read the Greeks again.” I agree. Point is – just because we’ve read Buber doesn’t mean we can’t read Nz, Kant, Thomas, Plato, heck – even Descartes! (See Marion, who trades in both Buberian thought and Cartesian studies).
Now, to try to steer this back to the comment from Nz. On the hither side of the deconstruction of “egological” metaphysics, let’s re-read Nz.
In the comment Huenemann posted, hasn’t Nz, in many ways, accurately described Socrates here? Sure, Socrates spoke plenty of “prudence” – but wasn’t his life actually a great “risk” and a “dangerous game”? The philosophical life, according to Socrates, leads to death (physical death, alienation, marginalization from community, political strife, etc). What could be more imprudent than that?
Hasn’t Nz’ rightly attacked both philosophers and Christians – neither of whom really take seriously how dangerous the games they play are? When I read Nz I very often see the crosshairs pinned right on my chest. Am I really risking anything by being a philosopher? Insofar as I am not, am I really being a philosopher? Hasn’t the modern academy just turned the philosopher into a bourgeois talking head? Shouldn’t we be “gadflies”? And, if so, isn’t Nz right – gadflies risk themselves constantly?
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maybe we can just read Nietzsche as saying “engage the world!” ?
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I should add that I am not identifying Nz’s “genuine philosopher” with Socrates. I think Mike is right, in a sense Nz is here (and everywhere) simply saying “engage the world”. But the kind of engagement he would suggest is much different than the kind of engagement Plato’s Socrates suggests. It seems that Nz is suggesting that the best life is the life of what Plato disparagingly calls the “democratic soul” in the ‘Republic’, and the task of life is to not let the democratic soul fall into tyranny (which Plato thinks it inevitably will). (Nz’s relationship with Socrates is pretty complicated, much more could be said about it).
Anyway, my point above is that in both cases the cost of engagement is quite high, and too many call themselves “philosophers” without bearing the burden of the title.
If we all agree that philosophical engagement bears a terrible cost (one which we are all too often unwilling to pay), the next question is then: how should the philosopher engage the world? And isn’t this just another way of asking the age old question: what is philosophy?
Here I think Vince is right on. Philosophy has far too often presented a distorted or at least unbalanced view of its own task – self over other and thought over action. Nz seems to avoid the latter error but, to my mind, one of the principle faults of Nz’s view is that his notion of “healthy engagement” does not make any room for the Other. This is why I find in Kierkegaard, who I think largely avoids both errors, a much more compelling story (and one that is every bit as sexy).
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At the risk of reverting to “egologic” thinking, I think Nz should be read as saying “engage the self.” His view is that philosophy ought to be a painful and rewarding effort to root out one’s deepest fears and face them. Socrates urged the same sort of reflection, but in a less personal way: root out and confront the limitations of human beings. Nz says: no, not “human beings,” but you, yourself. Are you a theist (for example) simply because you can’t face the terror of there being no plan, no objective purpose? Is it a crutch for you? Or (another example) are you doing philosophy simply to escape the rough and tumble adventures of the real world? Are you an escapist?
I agree with Kleiner that the quote from Nz is one of the ones that makes me feel like a target. And that is Nz’s whole endeavor: to get himself and his readers to take philosophy personally. I’d call it “the existential vector” of his philosophy. And I think the best reply to Nz is equally personal: what were you afraid if, you sick little Teutonic classicist? Afraid of trusting others and risking heartbreak? Afraid of basing your life on anything outside yourself? How’s that Napoleon complex working out for ya?
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I feel I must ask at this point what is wrong with “engaging the self”? How can one “engage the world”, if he does not understand himself? I believe one reason why many philosophers seem to give us this glimmer of hope, then disappoint us in the end is because they choose not to focus on themselves.
Maybe I am the only one that has felt it, but you begin reading books by Descartes, Kant, and Pascal and you get those “warm and fuzzies” thinking they have something really interesting and conceptual to say-then by the end you begin shaking your head in disappointment. Each of these men were great thinkers, but their final conclusions always seemed to lead to God and the unknown (which in my opinion meant that they came to a place they didnt understand and simply chose to dump those problems on a figure we cannot understand, let alone prove or disprove exists).
Pascal (whom I loved reading), had a great debate with himself over religion and God, and just when it seemed that Pascal was going to say that he still did not know what he believed, he gave up his debate and put it on God. Descartes provided these excellent steps for us to follow when trying to find what one believes, but he failed before he started by stating that he would never let go of his belief in God. Finally, Kant dives into this realm of “noumenal” and “phenomenal” worlds and almost denies anything the self can know (i.e. the five senses, etc), then ultimately declares that it is God (whether he was pandering or not I am not sure) that is running the show.
Undoubtedly, most of you will disagree with me, but what I believe makes Nietzsche so different than everyone else is he does not run from what he does not understand (unless we are talking about woman). Nietzsche seems to believe that we should not do as many of the other philosophers have done and run from things we can sense, and believe in things we cannot
Nietzsche (not unlike myself) , believes that God is ultimately a “philosophical copout” for those that cannot continue to explain their philosophy (since God cannot really be explained) or for those that may have added God into their philosophy to simply avoid the social or political fallouts. The Genuine philosopher (it seems to Nietzsche) is the person that is not afraid to leave their “comfort zone” and explore other ideas that maybe implausible or even grotesque to what one may have originally believed. The Genuine Philosopher is that thinker that is not afraid of political, social, or even religious fallout; rather he/she welcomes it as a way to not only engage themselves, but maybe the world too!
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Taken at face value, there is nothing wrong with “engaging the self”. The question is: “WHO is the self?” (It is not an accident that I have replaced the metaphysical “what” question with the more existential “who” question – this following Heidegger).
What Pascal knows, what Buber, Heidegger, and perhaps most profoundly Kierkegaard know, is that the self is not an isolated ego. Rather, as Vince has pointed out, it is relation that comes first. There is not some isolated self-contained subjectivity that then enters into relations through some mysterious bridge between egos. Rather, there is a relation out of which comes a self. (Read Kierkegaard’s opening chapter in Sickness Unto Death). The concept of a self prior to relation is a philosophical construct, not an existential reality. Authentic selfhood ARISES out of relation.
Who is the self? The self IS being-for-others, the self is first and foremost constituted by its relation to the Other. This is why Levinas describes authentic selfhood as “gift”. Kierkegaard simply describes the self as a “call to love” (see Works of Love).
You might find it odd that I put Pascal in the mix here, since he is often portrayed as an “existentialist” (by which one means something vaguely Sartrean). But I think Pascal is a profoundly postmodern thinker, and perhaps the savviest critic of Cartesianism and modernity around. But, you might protest, Pascal is constantly encouraging us to turn inward, away from the diversions of the world!
Here is an example: Pascal (who I also delight in reading) remarks in Pensee 136 (I think) that, “I have often said that the sole cause of man’s unhappiness is that he does not know how to stay quietly in his room.” (What a great and unpredictable line!!) Because of this, man puts constant diversions in front of himself.
But here is where Pascal and Nz could not be any more different: If you do sit quietly in your room for some time (I’ve tried this but I keep falling asleep!) what will you find? This is a dangerous game! But Pascal would answer that you will not find a ‘what’, but a someone. Or rather, a Somebody. Pascal is utterly convinced that written in the heart of man is a relationship to the Other. In turning inward you do not find yourself but in finding your always already relation to the Other!
So turn inward and engage the self. But if Levinas, Kierkegaard, Buber, Pascal, and Heidegger are right (over and against modernity), then you will not find anything except an arrow (a call) that points out.
One last remark that I always feel compelled to make anytime Nz comes up in the context of religion. Huenemann is probably sick of hearing this, but I will trot it out again. Let me be clear: I am (a) Christian and (b) quite persuaded by Nz’s attack on the god of the philosophers/metaphysicians. And, to be frank, I tend not to trust Christians (or whatever other faith) who are not Christians on the hither side of Nz. But, we should not pretend that the religious have no response to Nz – not all religious are cowards. Nz’s argument against Christianity presumes an excessively Platonic/dualistic/gnostic Christianity. I am not saying that there aren’t Xians out there who fit this bill – Christians have often been tempted by these views of the body. But I don’t think that is authentic Christianity. So, in the end, I’m afraid that Nietzsche’s thesis works only against a somewhat poor caricature of Christianity—his critique works if Christianity can be conflated with a Platonist/Gnostic account of the body and the afterlife.
But this is probably a discussion for a different thread. If folks are interested, perhaps Charlie would post his paper on Nz’s view of pathology and health to get a discussion going.
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Anyone interested in my Nz paper on his critique of Christianity as a sickness can find it (and other exciting essays!) at huenemanniac.com.
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