Author: Huenemann

Bryce Draper pointed out a NYT opinion piece that tries to explain the anger behind the Tea Party movement through Hegelian analysis. It makes for an interesting application of Hegelian thought.

It’s a little fancy for my tastes. I think the most insightful diagnosis of the deep divide in U.S. politics has been brought forward in this essay by Jonathan Haidt. The divide results from two different but equally-dominant mindsets: basically, those who favor social order vs. those who favor personal liberties. Here’s a relevant section of Haidt’s essay:

“My recent research shows that social conservatives do indeed rely upon those two foundations, but they also value virtues related to three additional psychological systems: ingroup/loyalty (involving mechanisms that evolved during the long human history of tribalism), authority/respect (involving ancient primate mechanisms for managing social rank, tempered by the obligation of superiors to protect and provide for subordinates), and purity/sanctity (a relatively new part of the moral mind, related to the evolution of disgust, that makes us see carnality as degrading and renunciation as noble). These three systems support moralities that bind people into intensely interdependent groups that work together to reach common goals. Such moralities make it easier for individuals to forget themselves and coalesce temporarily into hives, a process that is thrilling, as anyone who has ever “lost” him or herself in a choir, protest march, or religious ritual can attest.

“In several large internet surveys, my collaborators Jesse Graham, Brian Nosek and I have found that people who call themselves strongly liberal endorse statements related to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, and they largely reject statements related to ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. People who call themselves strongly conservative, in contrast, endorse statements related to all five foundations more or less equally. (You can test yourself at http://www.YourMorals.org.) We think of the moral mind as being like an audio equalizer, with five slider switches for different parts of the moral spectrum. Democrats generally use a much smaller part of the spectrum than do Republicans. The resulting music may sound beautiful to other Democrats, but it sounds thin and incomplete to many of the swing voters that left the party in the 1980s, and whom the Democrats must recapture if they want to produce a lasting political realignment.”

If this is so, then I think the Tea Partiers are angry simply because Obama represents to them a very different mindset, expressed through a different set of values. It is not a matter of intellectual disagreement with any particular policy; reading Tea Party screeds reveals that there isn’t any penetrating analysis going on. It’s more like when you are in a meeting, and someone stands up to speak, and their manner of speech and word choice immediately makes you feel like throttling them, regardless of the content of their speech. They’re just different, in a vaguely loathsome way. Adults are supposed to suppress these feelings, set them aside, and get on with rational public discourse, but the American political scene isn’t animated by adults, for the most part. A basic pre-rational prejudice fuels the animosity, and then catch phrases are employed to provide a veneer of political justification. And it works both ways; I saw plenty of the same phenomenon in the incredible public anger aimed at G. W. Bush, often without any well-conceived rationale or argument based on information.

Read Sohrab Ahmari’s op-ed piece in The Boston Globe decrying Iran’s treatment of dissidents.

.. and the consequences of how we see time. Just click on this link. (h/t Paul Huenemann)

You may want to take a few moments to check out these portraits by Steve Pyke of influential contemporary (or near-contemporary) philosophers, along with their views of the nature of philosophy. It’s interesting to see the diversity of views; one wonders if the same diversity would be found among practitioners of any other discipline (other than literary criticism, I suppose). (h/t to Brian Leiter’s blog.)

There is an interesting and lengthy discussion here about the causes of our behavior and the (possibly irrelevant?) stories we tell ourselves about the causes of our behavior. The traditional view is something along the lines of this: when we consciously deliberate over our actions, we should be held morally accountable for what we do, since the moral worth of what we do has some connection to the reasons we take ourselves to have for doing it. (Some authors call this a “neo-Kantian” view, which seems to me inapt for several reasons, but set that aside.) But suppose it turns out – as some research suggests – that even when we pause to deliberate, our decisions may have less to do with our reasoning than we commonly suppose. So, for example, some studies say that if you find a dime, or smell fresh cookies, you are far more likely to help someone in need than otherwise. And that’s independently of the reasons you recite to yourself about whether you should help the person in need. If this is so, then do we still consider your reasons for action as morally relevant?

In truth, the issue comes down to acting from causes vs. acting from reasons. Lots of things act from causes, and it seems incorrect to hold anything accountable for what they do merely because of causes (consider blaming a stone for rolling downhill, or blaming a person for being hit by a meteor and splattering an elegant dining party with their bloody innards). But when they act from reasons, we do hold people morally accountable. Maybe this is because actions done for reasons are somehow free, or maybe this is because actions done for reasons issue from the appropriate sorts of mechanisms (I am trying to set aside the question of determinism). But now suppose that any time we find an act supposedly done for reasons, we find causes in the mix that very strongly and reliably influence the action. What effect does that have on our attributions of moral responsibility?

Anyway, have a look at the intelligent debate. Nice work. (Thanks to Rob Sica for pointing the discussion out to me.)