Forgiving dumbsh*t decisions

I make many dumbsh*t decisions, by which I mean decisions that are made without taking obviously important and relevant information or moral considerations into account. And I’m not alone: we are all guilty of this. I believe we are morally responsible for these decisions, and blameworthy for them. But I also believe that many or most of them should be forgiven.

So, for example, when I make the dumbsh*t decision not to offer you a ride home (when it’s obvious that you need one) I should be able to say to you, “I’m sorry I didn’t offer you a ride home; I can’t even explain why I didn’t, other than it was just a dumbsh*t decision on my part,” and you should probably reply, “That’s okay, but please try to be kinder next time.”

But they should not always be forgiven. If a doctor told me, “I’m sorry I didn’t try to save your leg; I can’t even explain why I didn’t, other than it was just a dumbsh*t decision on my part,” I wouldn’t forgive her, and don’t believe she should be forgiven.

So my question: what are the conditions for a dumbsh*t decision to be worthy of forgiveness?

Here are some that come to mind: (a) the consequences must be fairly trivial, (b) the person shouldn’t repeat the dumbsh*t decision more than a very few times, (c) all the other conditions that should apply to making a bad decision forgivable — like, the person’s apology must be genuine, etc.

Can anyone think of other conditions, or exceptions to these? Or can anyone come up with a general explanation for why we find some but not all dumbsh*t decisions forgivable? (Or just call them “dumb” decisions, if you prefer, and forgive my choice of terminology!)

Online philosophy conference

The second online philosophy conference is now available here. You may want to explore it just to see the sorts of things professional philosophers are talking and writing about these days. The keynote address, by Jeff McMahon, is about pacifism and philosophical issues related to war — timely topic! — and is available in a video format.

Summertime musings: Philosophy takes on grilling

The age old debate – charcoal vs gas – takes on a philosophical tone (I am borrowing all concepts from Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology):
Does charcoal grilling help us “learn to think”, while gas grilling frustrates the true essence of thought?
In other words, does gas grilling necessarily involve technological thinking? Is it guilty of “enframing” and “challenging-forth” the fire, wherein we make “unreasonable demands” on the flame? While charcoal grilling, on the contrary, exemplifies the kind of “listening” and “shepherding of Being” that Heidegger is after?

What’s essential to philosophy?

As the semester comes to an end, you might take a few minutes to ponder this question: what’s essential in a philosophical education? Is it stuff you learn (names, theories, etc), or how to argue, or personal discovery/enrichment? What sort of experience said to you “This is what it’s all about”?