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An argument against time

The other day in USU 1320 we examined an argument against the reality of time:

1. Time requires change. (As shown by another argument, which turns upon the inherent impossibility of distinguishing two lengths of changeless time.)
2. Change requires (a) a past state and (b) a future state.
3. Any past state does not now exist.
4. Any future state does not now exist.
5. Hence, there is no change now.
6. Hence, there is no time now.

And since this argument can be presented at each and every “now,” it would seem to follow that time is “at all times” nonexistent, i.e., time is unreal.

It’s a nifty argument, since it is so hard to see where anything goes wrong. (And yet it seems wrong, doesn’t it?)

By the way, I think a parallel argument can be given against the reality of space. It gets a little weird around premise 3, but follow along:

1. Space requires some sort of extended dimension (length, width, etc.).
2. Any extended dimension can be divided into an “over there (1)” and an “over there (2)”.
3. But “over there (1)” is not right here.
4. And “over there (2)” is not right here.
5. Hence, there is no extended dimension right here.
6. Hence, there is no space right here.

And since this argument can be presented at every possible spot, it would seem to follow that space is “at all spaces” nonexistent, i.e., space is unreal.

Nerdy philosophy humor

Over the past couple of days there’s been a flurry of posts over at Brian Leiter’s blog, all concerning goofy ways in which famous philosophers’ names have entered the rest of the world. Yes, a bit geeky, but in case you’re interested, here it is.

Vanity link

What? Can’t get enough of listening to Huenemann lecture? Here’s an iLecture for you! (Recommended especially if you’re having trouble getting to sleep!)

Argument for dualism

In PHIL 4410 yesterday, I offered Descartes’s argument for dualism:

1. Anything that we can legitimately conceive is logically possible.
2. We can legitimately conceive being conscious without having a brain that’s doing anything. (We can imagine being a disembodied consciousness.)
3. So, it is logically possible to be conscious without having a brain that is doing anything.
4. For any X and Y, if X can exist without Y, then X is not identical with Y.
5. Therefore, consciousness is not identical with having a brain that is doing anything.

It’s an interesting argument, since the premises look pretty plausible. Any thoughts? Where does the argument go wrong?

Here’s another item to consider. Can the same argument be used to show that, say, a computer operating system like Windows is not identical with a computer doing anything? Can we legitimately conceive Windows existing in a world devoid of computers? Or is consciousness seemingly different from a computer operating system in this regard?

(I raise this last point because I often like to compare human consciousness to an operating system: the mind is the software, and the brain is the hardware, and the software is somehow present in the organization and functioning of the hardware, and can’t exist without it. I’m wondering whether this argument points out an important flaw in my comparison.)

Check-out line theology

I thought readers of all “denominations” would appreciate this. At the check-out line in the grocery store, I came across The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Faith (subtitle: “how to deepen your journey with God”). I probably would’ve bought it, had I not felt guilty about supporting such endeavors with my cash. The clerk thought I was weird because I couldn’t stop giggling.