Philosophy@Utah State

Home » Uncategorized » On various kinds of teleology

On various kinds of teleology

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 98 other followers

Old Main, USU

T-shirts


You need a Philosophy T-shirt! For more information, please click here.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

* Interested in presenting a paper at an UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE or publishing in an UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL? You should consider it! To see what options are available, both in state and out of state, click here.

PHILOSOPHY BOWLING RESULTS

• Is the world eternal? YES
• Do humans have contra-causal free will (i.e., can humans do otherwise)? NO
• Is beauty in the eye of the beholder? YES
• Do humans have souls? YES
• Are there natural rights? YES
• Is it morally permissible to eat meat? NO
• Is the unexamined life worth living? NO
• Is truth subjectivity? YES
• Is virtue necessary for happiness? YES
• Can a computer have a mind? YES
• Can humans know reality as it is in itself? YES
• Is hell other people? YES
• Can art be created accidentally? NO
• Can we change the past? NO
• Are numbers real? NO
• Is it always better to know the truth? YES

Blog Stats

  • 192,596 hits

Teleology – which some might define as “the (allegedly) goal-directed behavior of natural beings” – is in fact a family of different kinds of takes on explaining natural phenomena. It rarely receives the patient and open-minded treatment it deserves. But I’m happy to report an exception – this article, by Stephen T. Asma, which defends a plausible view of the importance of teleology in explaining biological phenomena, and “why there will never be a Newton of biology”. Relevant excerpt:

Aboutness in nature doesn’t need to be superadded. It’s already everywhere, but our mechanical paradigm of nature and our Cartesian biases oblige us to ignore it. Goal directed behavior is not just in neo-cortical representational consciousness, but in subcortical SEEKING systems and nonrepresentational latent action patterns. Philosophers like Nagel and Arnold think we don’t have meaning without reasons, but we do. We have intentionality in high degrees, even before we have language. Not only is the body intentionally oriented to other bodies, but many of our own mental events are also prelinguistic projects.

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: