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You may want to take a few moments to check out these portraits by Steve Pyke of influential contemporary (or near-contemporary) philosophers, along with their views of the nature of philosophy. It’s interesting to see the diversity of views; one wonders if the same diversity would be found among practitioners of any other discipline (other than literary criticism, I suppose). (h/t to Brian Leiter’s blog.)

There is an interesting and lengthy discussion here about the causes of our behavior and the (possibly irrelevant?) stories we tell ourselves about the causes of our behavior. The traditional view is something along the lines of this: when we consciously deliberate over our actions, we should be held morally accountable for what we do, since the moral worth of what we do has some connection to the reasons we take ourselves to have for doing it. (Some authors call this a “neo-Kantian” view, which seems to me inapt for several reasons, but set that aside.) But suppose it turns out – as some research suggests – that even when we pause to deliberate, our decisions may have less to do with our reasoning than we commonly suppose. So, for example, some studies say that if you find a dime, or smell fresh cookies, you are far more likely to help someone in need than otherwise. And that’s independently of the reasons you recite to yourself about whether you should help the person in need. If this is so, then do we still consider your reasons for action as morally relevant?

In truth, the issue comes down to acting from causes vs. acting from reasons. Lots of things act from causes, and it seems incorrect to hold anything accountable for what they do merely because of causes (consider blaming a stone for rolling downhill, or blaming a person for being hit by a meteor and splattering an elegant dining party with their bloody innards). But when they act from reasons, we do hold people morally accountable. Maybe this is because actions done for reasons are somehow free, or maybe this is because actions done for reasons issue from the appropriate sorts of mechanisms (I am trying to set aside the question of determinism). But now suppose that any time we find an act supposedly done for reasons, we find causes in the mix that very strongly and reliably influence the action. What effect does that have on our attributions of moral responsibility?

Anyway, have a look at the intelligent debate. Nice work. (Thanks to Rob Sica for pointing the discussion out to me.)

So I just got back from a Fides et Ratio Seminar.  A big theme all week, as we read the “Fathers, Doctors, and Popes” (that was the title of the Seminar) was the meeting of the Christian Biblical tradition with Greek philosophy.  How is this to be thought of and worked out?  Here is a relevant and frankly amusing passage from St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses, with a few notes in brackets from me:  (St. Gregory of Nyssa, c335-394)
”
The foreign wife will follow him, for there are certain things derived from profane education which should not be rejected when we propose to give birth to virtue. Indeed, moral and natural philosophy may become at certain times a comrade, friend, and companion of life to the higher way, provided that the offspring of this union introduce nothing of a foreign defilement.

[Gregory of Nyssa comes down clearly on the side of appropriating what we can from the Greek.  Just as the Jews took the Egyptians gold and refashioned it into the tabernacle, so too should we take truth wherever we find it – though we should appropriate it to new and proper ends and should leave behind anything “foreign”.]

Since his son had not been circumcised, so as to cut off completely everything hurtful and impure, the angel who met them brought the fear of death.  His wife appeased the angle when she presented her offspring as pure by completely removing that mark by which the foreigner was known.

I think that if someone who has been initiated under the guidance of the history follows closely the order of the historical figures, the sequence of the development in virtue marked out in our account will be clear.  There is something fleshy and uncircumcised in what is taught by philosophy’s generative faculty; when that has been completely removed, there remains the pure Israelite race.

For example, pagan philosophy says that the soul is immortal.  That is a pious offspring.  But is also says that souls pass from bodies to bodies and are changed from a rational to an irrational nature [Plato’s transmigration of souls].  This is a fleshy and alien foreskin.  … …
”

So am I the only one that giggles at this?  Philosophy’s “generative faculty”?  And the “fleshy foreskin” of erroneous Platonic teachings?  That is some image to use!  Some may prefer the so-called “baptized Aristotle”, but what about the circumcised Plato?!

SCHAUMBURG, IL—In an ultimately futile act some have described as courageous and others have called a mere postponing of the inevitable, existentialist firefighter James Farber delayed three deaths Monday.

Full story from The Onion here.

I’ve been reading some old and great books in preparation for a week-long Fides et Ratio seminar at Thomas More College next week.  It has been great.  Augustine, Albert the Great, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Francis de Sales, St. Teresa of Avila, etc.  The seminar is great, and I wish more academic conferences were run this way.   15 people sit around a table.  No prepared presentations, just open discussion.  We spend a week together, and it is pretty intense (all day and into the early night each day).

Anyway, one of the readings is ‘On the Incarnation’ by St. Athanasius.  The short introduction by C.S. Lewis is worth the price of admission.  He presents a wonderful little argument for reading old and great books, and how reading them can help us avoid error.  I thought two passages were worth quoting at length, but you can read the whole introduction (and the book by Athanasius, if you want!) here.

“THERE is a strange idea abroad that in every subject the ancient books should be read only by the professionals, and that the amateur should content himself with the modern books. Thus I have found as a tutor in English Literature that if the average student wants to find out something about Platonism, the very last thing he thinks of doing is to take a translation of Plato off the library shelf and read the Symposium. He would rather read some dreary modern book ten times as long, all about “isms” and influences and only once in twelve pages telling him what Plato actually said. The error is rather an amiable one, for it springs from humility. The student is half afraid to meet one of the great philosophers face to face. He feels himself inadequate and thinks he will not understand him. But if he only knew, the great man, just because of his greatness, is much more intelligible than his modern commentator. The simplest student will be able to understand, if not all, yet a very great deal of what Plato said; but hardly anyone can understand some modern books on Platonism. It has always therefore been one of my main endeavours as a teacher to persuade the young that first-hand knowledge is not only more worth acquiring than second-hand knowledge, but is usually much easier and more delightful to acquire.”

…

“None of us can fully escape this blindness [of our own contemporary assumptions], but we shall certainly increase it, and weaken our guard against it, if we read only modern books. Where they are true they will give us truths which we half knew already. Where they are false they will aggravate the error with which we are already dangerously ill. The only palliative is to keep the clean sea breeze of the centuries blowing through our minds, and this can be done only by reading old books. Not, of course, that there is any magic about the past. People were no cleverer then than they are now; they made as many mistakes as we. But not the same mistakes. They will not flatter us in the errors we are already committing; and their own errors, being now open and palpable, will not endanger us. Two heads are better than one, not because either is infallible, but because they are unlikely to go wrong in the same direction. To be sure, the books of the future would be just as good a corrective as the books of the past, but unfortunately we cannot get at them.”