Religion and the public square

Since I keep hearing some of my students fret about the threat of ‘theocracy’ in this country, I thought maybe we should do a little political philosophy on the blog. 

I am no defender of George W. Bush (or the neo-cons), but a ‘tyrant’ or a ‘theocrat’ he is not.  What silliness, to be perfectly honest.  This is as ridiculous as those who suggest that Obama is a Muslim.  When I press these students to name a single policy as an example of our alleged move toward ‘theocracy’, they always come up silent.  But that hardly seems to stop them from repeating, diligently and with all the appropriate defiant anger, such silly claims.

So let’s revisit what the First Amendment says about religion:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

There are two clauses that speak of religion, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  Richard John Neuhaus, in a recent article on this that I will here parrot, writes that recent jurisprudence has severely deformed the real (original) meaning here.  He writes,

The deepest deformation is the subordinating of free exercise to no-establishment. Once we forget that no-establishment is a means and instrument in support of free exercise, it is a short step to talking about the supposed conflict or tension between the two provisions. And from there it is a short step to the claim, as it has been claimed in numerous court decisions, that the two parts of the religion clause are “pitted against one another” and must somehow be “balanced.” ’

As he points out, the consequence of this inverted understanding is that ‘whenever the government advances, religion must retreat’.  But since government is constantly advancing into more and more areas of our social and personal lives, it is suggested that believing Americans must surrender their faith in the ‘public square’.

How absurd.  When it is written that ‘Congress shall make no law’, it is clearly limiting government – not religion.  The purpose of the First Amendment religion clauses IS NOT to limit religion or even religion’s place in the public square.  The purpose of the clauses is to limit government from interfering with free (and open and public) religious expression.  Religious persons and churches are left perfectly free to try to influence the government, all that is restricted is the government’s ability to interfere with the lives of churches and individual believers.  Let me restate that, since this appears to be news to many secularists:  the Religion Clauses are not meant to protect government from religion, rather they are meant to protect religion from ‘the overweening ambitions of the modern state.’  (Note that this free expression, then, is protected and could be appealed to even in those areas of life where the government may find itself involved – such as education.)

This is, of course, an ‘originalist’ interpretation (rather like the interpretation Scalia encouraged in his recent talk here).  But it is also the most obvious – note that the entire First Amendment has the aim of limiting government’s power to interfere with free expression (of various sorts).   

“Flock of dodos” screening

From Religious Studies Club:

The USU School of Teacher Education and Leadership will be hosting a movie entitled “Flock of Dodos: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Circus” tomorrow (Friday October 10th) at 6:30 in the Emma Eccles Jones Education Building Auditorium (Education 131).

This video documentary highlights the debate between proponents of the concept of intelligent design and the scientific consensus that supports evolution. The documentary was first screened publicly on February 2, 2006 in Kansas, where much of the public controversy on intelligent design began. It examines the disagreements that proponents of intelligent design have with the scientific consensus position of evolution.

From what I’ve seen, the film has been praised as being very even-handed.

Great Books Club

A student has suggested the formation of an informal ‘Great Books Club’.  The idea is that the club would meet once a week (time and place to be determined, though Thursday at 6:30pm was suggested).
 
What the group would read would be negotiable, but at the top of Dan’s list (the student who suggested such a thing) were Dante- The Divine Comedy, Shakespeare- King Lear and Hamlet, and Cervantes- Don Quixote.
I think this is a great idea.  As Plato says, lovers of learning should love the whole of learning, so  we philosophers (lovers of wisdom) should want to read everything we can.  And there is some reason to hope that there is interest in such things.  Two examples that help save me from absolute despair over the place of reading in our culture:
a) Just this morning I was reading in the ~Quad Side Cafe, and the student sitting next to me was reading Russell’s ‘Why I am not a Christian’.  I am not sure if that is a ‘great book’, but still impressive.  I asked him if it was for a course, and he replied, ‘no, I am just interesting in things like this.’
b) When I was a graduate student in Indiana, I went to get my oil changed at a Jiffy Lube.  The mechanic and I got to talking and when I told him I was studying philosophy, his grease-smeared face peered up and he said, ‘Oh, have you read Heidegger’s Being and Time?’  Apparently he was on his third reading of it, though he only had graduated from high school.  When pressed for why he reads such things, he said, ‘I guess I’m just interested in hermeneutic phenomenology’.
So there is hope!  
Students should post here with suggestions about date and time, and I will let Dan organize it from there.
 

The Gettier problem

I’ve started preparing to teach PHIL 4300 (Epistemology) in the spring, and while doing so I’ve been kicking around the Gettier problem in my mind. What? Haven’t heard of it? Allow me to explain.

A standard account of knowledge in philosophy (since Plato) is this. I know something (call it “x”) when (1) x is in fact true, (2) I believe x, and (3) I have some good reasons for believing x. This seems to fit a great many cases of knowledge. It’s hard to come up with counterexamples. But then along came Edmund Gettier in the 1960s who provided cases like this one:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

    1. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith’s evidence for (1) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (1) entails:

    2. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (1) to (2), and accepts (2) on the grounds of (1), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (2) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (2) is then true, though proposition (1), from which Smith inferred (2), is false.

OK, sort of lame. But it is a counterexample.

My own temptation is to say that Smith was not justified in believing Jones was going to get the job, and so wasn’t justified in believing that the person who would get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Yes, he had some evidence for thinking Jones would get the job, and so maybe he was justified in believing that his belief was justified, but in fact it wasn’t justified. Does that make sense?