On wearing neckties

“Clothes make the man.  Naked people have little or no influence on society”  – Mark Twain

I recently read an excellent book by Phillippe Beneton called “Equality by Default: An Essay on Modernity as Confinement.”  Equality by default is “founded on an idea of man which breaks with all the humanism of the West.  Man is pure indetermination, autonomy without a compass, liberty without a vocation, he is what he makes himself.”  We have more rights in the modern age and our culture is more egalitarian, but we find ourselves dispossessed.  Modern man finds himself emptied out and isolated.   Since autonomy and liberty have become absolute values, and culture has been “deconstructed” and relativized to death, we have no bearings remaining to find our way.  This, then, gives rise to a mechanistic understanding of the person and society as “virtues, customs, and forms recede in favor of methods, rules, and procedures.”

One chapter applies this view to academic dress (an essay called “The Alma Mater and the Necktie”).  The problem with the loss of the necktie (and the general shabby dress of most academics these days), is that the loss of form leads to a loss of seriousness on the part of everyone involved in the education process.  These forms (culturally inherited norms around dress and such things) help us to see distinctions “among activities, times, ways of being”.  The academic who dresses in the proper form rejects the idea that everything is equivalent, that going to class is no more serious an affair than going to see a movie.  The proper form of dress, then, helps to communicate the seriousness and nobility of the experience of philosophical inquiry and wonder to the student.  After all, teaching is about more than transmitting information to students.  Teaching also concerns teaching “attitudes of the intellect”.  So, Beneton says, respect for proper academic dress help cultivate the “habitus required for intellectual life”.

One rather surprising claim – it is actually less de-personalizing to wear a “uniform” than to wear whatever one wants.  When we wear whatever we want, he suggests, we make it more difficult to develop certain forms of personal relationships and to see distinctions between different activities and ways of being.

I think Beneton is really on to something with this view.  One of the things I have learned from teaching large classes (150-200 students) is that form matters.  In such classes, it is impossible to develop personal relationships with more than a handful of students.  As such, many students make all sorts of judgments and pre-judgments about the instructor and even the discipline he teaches based on how the instructor walks into the room, what they wear, how they speak, etc.  As a concrete example, I am always surprised by how often my beard comes up in my evaluations.

I have always dressed pretty well to teach, but have considered wearing a tie for some time.  In particular, I have often considered wearing a bow tie.  I like the bow tie because of how it looks, but I also have fond memories of them.  I grew up wearing bow ties to Cotillion for many years as a child and young man.  (Cotillions are ballroom dancing lessons – we learned to dance, boys learned to bow, girls learned to curtsy, we learned formal table manners and social graces, this sort of a thing).

Anyway, the Beneton essay put me over the top.  Beneton is right, it is not up to me what I wear.  To think it is entirely up to me is to think that I have liberty without vocation, autonomy without a compass, that I am whatever I make myself.  The tie says NO to all of this modern autonomous nonsense.  So, then, the tie and the bow tie will be my little contribution, the little blow I strike, against the culture of autonomy.  Take that!

Is philosophy dead?

In my Contemporary European Philosophy class, I often remark that Nz’s declaration of the death of god (and Foucault’s sequel, the death of the subject) turned out to be, shall we say, rather premature.  The death of philosophy has been oft declared, and all who have declared it dead are now long dead while philosophy continues to plug along.

Many of our blog readers are likely aware of Stephen Hawking’s new book, in which he declares that “philosophy is dead” (you guessed it, science killed it).  But this response from John Haldane is worth reading.  He responds to several arguments (multiverse, spontaneous creation) raised in Hawking’s new book, and concludes:

“As Hawking and Mlodinow occasionally seem to recognize, far from philosophy being dead, having been killed by science, the deepest arguments in this area are not scientific but philosophical. And if the philosophical reasoning runs in the direction I have suggested, it is not only philosophy but also natural theology that is alive and ready to bury its latest would-be undertakers.”

The decline effect

Jonah Lehrer has an article in a recent New Yorker about what can be called “the decline effect.” (I would link to the article, but it’s available by subscription only, and the available abstract is worthless.) Anyway, here’s the idea. Scientists from across the spectrum are finding that many of the correlations they’ve discovered seem to be “wearing off” over time. But why should this be? Lehrer suggests that it’s a matter of making big news over careful but flukey studies. So imagine this: scientists are always running all kinds of experiments and studies in many directions. Just as a matter of chance, some of them once in a while will “luck out” and examine a population which shows an especially strong correlation. Big news! Publication in Nature! Goes into textbooks! New nugget of knowledge! Then, as scientists try to replicate the study, they find weaker and weaker correlations. Hmm. The “decline effect” is especially troublesome in pharmaceutical research, where we’re finding that some of the fancy new drugs, despite initial appearances, aren’t all that more effective than drugs being used in the 50s.

But it’s hard to get these facts known, since journals are rarely interested in articles which report that scientists were unable to find some strong correlation. Somebody needs to go back and read some Popper, I think.

Thinking about grad school in philosophy?

Then here are some FAQs for you, courtesy of Michael Huemer at UC-Boulder. I think most of what Huemer says is true, though the picture he paints is a bit too bleak. What he leaves out is just how much fun it is to go to grad school in philosophy (at least, if you’re a philosophy geek): all of the classes, the late-night conversations, the stories you build up about goofy, smart professors and the trials they put you through, etc. Also, it’s a fact that there’s no better job in the world than helping students think through philosophical problems. (I am of course setting aside jobs requiring the operation of minisubs by remote control.)